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CORPORATIONS-GENERAL EFFECT OF STATUTES PROIDBITING
CORPORATE LOANS TO DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND STOCKHOLDERS-

Over the years a number of states have felt that loans by private corporations to their directors and stockholders should be regulated to
protect the interests of creditors and, in many cases, stockholders.
At present, twenty-two states1 have statutes which either alsolutely
prevent such loans or else limit their scope, and this number will
probably increase. A typical statute may be found in New Jersey:
"No corporation shall loan money to a_ stockholder or officer thereof.
If any such loan be made the officers who make it, or assent thereto,

1 California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and South
Dakota.

214

MicmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 48

shall be jointly and severally liable, to the extent of such loan and
interest, for all the debts of the corporation until the repayment of
the sum so loaned."2 Not only are there numerous variations among
the statutes, but there are differences among their judicial interpretations. The purpose of this comment is to consider the necessity for
the statutes and to indicate the variations which may be encountered.

A. The Purpose of the Statutes
The reason generally given for enactment of the statute is "to
prevent an improper withdrawal of capital,"3 or as it is put by the
Supreme Court of Califomia,4 to prevent directors from taking advantage of their position to grant themselves or their colleagues (and
stockholders, in a number of other states) unwarranted loans and
thus dissipate corporate funds in violation of their trust. The sufficiency of these reasons may be questioned. The fact that a director
assents to a corporate loan to a co-director or a stockholder does not
indicate that he has breached his trust,5 contrary to the idea expressed by the California court. An early Maryland court succumbed
to this idea when it relied on a violation of the statute as evidence of
a breach of duty on the part of the directors. 6
If an "improper withdrawal of capital" means a withdrawal which
creates insolvency or which occurs after insolvency, the loan statute
adds nothing to the remedies already available. The corporation,
receiver or trustee in bankruptcy may hold the directors liable for
breach of their fiduciary duty; and the creditors, in most cases, will
be able to petition successfully for the appointment of a receiver who
may sue the directors for their breach of trust. However, in those
cases where a creditor is unable to initiate a receivership, there is no
way, in the absence of a statute, for him to hold the directors liable,
unless the corporation goes into voluntary receivership. If the corporation is solvent, directors still may be liable to it if the loan is
considered improper; and creditors, of course, have no cause to com2 14 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 8, §10.
3 SPELLMAN, CoRPORATI! DIRl!CTORS 557 (1931).
4 Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. (2d) 878, 151 P. (2d) 840 (1944).
5 Blum v. Fleishhacker, (D. C. Cal. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 527.
6 Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 A. 621 (1901). A later Maryland

court decided
that a loan of money in violation of the statute was a misapplication of the corporation's
assets, which along with other acts of mismanagement furnished ground for appointment
of a receiver. Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 155 Md. 549, 142 A. 885 (1928).
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plain, for their security remains sufficient. In addition, it is difficult
to comprehend why a state should absolutely forbid the making of
loans, since there is no corollary between a loan and a dissipation of
capital (which the statute is intended to prevent). 7 The fact that
some statutes do allow loans under certain conditions may indicate
that a few legislatures have realized that a loan is not necessarily a
dissipation of capital, and that common law and other statutory
remedies may be adequate to preserve the rights of the corporation
and its creditors where the loan is made under those conditions.8
There is, nevertheless, something to be said in favor of the statute
from the standpoint of the corporation and creditors. There is no
question about the liability of the directors; it is made absolute. 9 It
is unnecessary to prove a breach of the directors' :fiduciary duty; the
breach of trust is conclusively presumed from the violation of the
statute.10 Moreover, the situation mentioned previously, in which a
creditor who is unable to institute receivership proceedings has no
remedy against the directors, is eliminated if the statute allows a suit
by a creditor. If the courts would get away from the idea that the
statute is intended to prevent dissipation of assets and interpret it
instead as assuring to creditors another means by which they can collect their claims in whole or in part, the policy criticism might not
be justified. If loans, proper or improper under common law principles,
have been made, creditors will receive payment on their claims, to the
extent of the loans, from the directors. Of course, this solution may
place a great burden on the latter, but they probably will have the right
to secure reimbursement from the corporation if the loans have been
proper. The practical objection, however, is that this right is an empty
one, for there are no assets or, in the usual situation, insufficient assets
from which full reimbursement may be made. Nevertheless, directors
7 3 FLETCHER, CYo. CoRP., rev. ed., §955 (1947). But it would seem that a company
which has no power to lend money cannot ratify loans made by a director or officer to
himself. People's Bank v. Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co., 210 Ala. 678, 99 S. 87 (1924).
8 See notes 17, 18, 19 and 20, infra.
9GRANcE, CORPORATION LAw FOR OFFICERS AND DmEOToRs 427 (1935): "But if
a loan violates a statutory provision, the liability is absolute, and neither good faith in
making the loan, nor ignorance of the statute will be accepted by the courts as a defense.
In other words, the officers and directors authorizing the forbidden loan are practically
guarantors of its repayment." The New Hampshire statute even makes the stockholders
who received the loan liable, to the extent of the loan, for the corporation's debts then
existing or afterwards contracted. N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 274, §103. The state,
however, is alone in this respect.
10 Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 A. 621 (1901).
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could authorize proper loans thereunder without any imputation of
breach of trust.
It may be that this view is the theory lying behind Swan v. Burnham,11 in which the New Hampshire court held that a creditor of
a corporation has a right to action against the directors to enforce
their statutory liability independent of his right of action against the
corporation. Certainly the creditor is given more freedom under this
decision than he is given in Massachusetts, where he can invoke the
aid of the statute only if he has :first made demand upon the corporation for satisfaction of its debt.12 The only justification for the Massachusetts view is its recognition that the primary obligation to a
creditor rests in the corporation itself, not in the directors or officers.
Actually, the decision in the Swan case is not so radical, for, since
it is reasonable to believe that a creditor will have less scruples than
the corporation against suing the directors under the statute, the latter may be less willing to authorize improper loans. Consequently,
the purpose of the statute as commonly set forth would be attained.
B.

Statutory Provisions and Interpretations

The statute, of course, cannot be relied upon if it is shown that
the transaction complained of is not a loan. Whether the transaction
is a loan is a problem with which the courts are continually faced,
for there seems to be no test which may be used. In a recent California case13 a corporation repaid to its directors an amount which
the directors had advanced to the company, although the contingency
establishing the company's legal obligation to repay the directors according to their agreement had not materialized. The court held that
since the contingency had not occurred, the corporation's act was
not a repayment but rather a loan, and, since it violated the statute,
the directors were liable to the judgment creditor prosecuting the
11 70 N.H. 580, 49 A. 93 (1901).
12 Old Colony Boot & Shoe Co.

v. Parker-Sampson-Adams Co., 183 Mass. 557, 67
N.E. 870 (1903). The problem facing the court in the case was whether the liability
of a director under the loan statute was provable in bankruptcy against the director's
estate under the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The court decided that the director's
liability was not a debt, but was only contingent upon the failure of the corporation to
satisfy the creditor. Consequently, his discharge in bankruptcy after the creditor had
obtained judgment against the corporation was not a bar to a bill in equity to enforce
the statutory liability of the director.
1s Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. (2d) 878, 151 P. (2d) 840 (1944).
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suit. Similarly, the execution by a corporation of a note to a bank
to which a director was indebted has been held to be a loan or guaranty of the director's obligation for which he is liable under the statute.14 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Maryland has held
not to be a loan a transaction in which the directors of a corporation
took from an officer who had misappropriated its assets his notes with
collateral security for the amount of the embezzlement.HS In none
of these cases can it be said that there has been a loan within the
traditional meaning of the word.
Where a loan is made contrary to the statute, however, the security
(e.g., a note) given therefor will not be declared void and unenforceable by the corporation, for otherwise the corporation will be without
a remedy to recover that to which it is entitled.16
Of the twenty-two states which prohibit loans in one form or
another, four restrict the limitation to directors and officers only.17
Moreover, of the eighteen states which do apply the prohibition to
stockholders, five restrict it to loans made upon the security of the
stock of the corporation.18 Consequently, no protection is secured by
the statute if loans are made upon other types of security or upon no
security at all. The effectiveness of the statute is further curtailed
in one of the above five states, California,1° and in Michigan,20 by
allowing a loan to remain valid if it is approved by a certain fraction
of the board of directors. Thus, of the twenty-two states which do
have loan statutes, ten allow loans to be made to stockholders. It
would seem, therefore, that regardless of the statute, creditors and
corporations in certain instances in those ten states must resort to their
14Jn re

Globe Drug Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 114.
v. Penniman, 105 Md. 452, 66 A. 282 (1907). A payment by a corporation to an officer, with the consent of the directors and stockholders, so that the officer
might purchase property to transfer to the corporation ( without which the corporation
could not carry on its business) was held not to be a loan within the meaning of the
statute in New York Credit Men's Assn. v. Dingfelder, 287 N.Y. 531, 41 N.E. (2d)
86 (1942).
16 In re Wood's Estate, 299 Mich. 635, 1 N.W. (2d) 19 (1941).
1122 Ga. Code Ann. (1933) §723; ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948 Cum. Supp.)
c. 32, §157.42 (d); 25 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1948) §212; Conn. Gen. Stat. (Rev. 1949)
c. 250, §5168. In Connecticut, the limitation is not absolute. If interest is paid to the
corporation, if a majority of the directors approve, and if adequate security is given,
loans may be made to officers and directors.
18 Cal. Corp. C. A. (Deering, 1947) §823(a); Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 65, §36;
20 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §301.32; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 21, §180; 18 Okla. Stat.
(1947 Cum. Supp.) §l.175(a). It is even doubtful whether the Oklahoma statute prohibits
loans to stockholders.
19 Cal. Corp. C. A. (Deering, 1947) §823(a).
20 15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.46.
15 Murphy
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common law and other statutory remedies. Considering the statute's
purpose as. it is commonly set forth, there seems to be no reason why
the loan prohibition should not include loans to stockholders also.
Dissipation of assets may be as large when a loan is made to a stockholder as when made to a director or officer; a creditor may need as
much protection in the one case as he does in the other.
_Most of the statutes provide that "the directors of a corporation.who
vote for or assent to the making of a loan ... shall be jointly and
severally liable ... for the amount of such loan until the repayment
thereof."21 The Illinois statute also provides for a conclusive presumption of assent by the director if he attends the meeting of the
board at which the action in question is considered, and if he has not
dissented thereto. 22 This conclusive presumption is approved in Indiana, although its statute imposes liability on a director only "for knowingly and wilfully making or assenting to a loan."23 If a director
must "knowingly and wilfully" assent in order to be held liable, it is
difficult to apprehend how there can be a presumption of assent. It
may be that the Massachusetts statute is stricter in that it requires a
showing that the director voted in opposition to the transaction. 24 In
New York a director will be exempted from liability if he can show
that he had no knowledge of the loan. 25 However, it would seem
that if he attends the meeting at which the loan is made, the reasonable presumption is that he will know of the loan, even though his
assent or dissent has not been recorded.
An important and often difficult problem which the courts have
had to face involves the question ofwhom the statute is intended to
benefit. Did the legislature intend to protect the creditors of the corporation, the stockholders or both? Only in Mississippi does the statute expressly provide for an action by creditors;26 no mention is made
of an action by stockholders also. 27 On the other hand, five states28
21m. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948 Cum. Supp.) c. 32, §l57.42(d).
22 Id., §l57.42(h).
23 25 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1948) §251.
24 5 Mass. Ann. Laws (1948) c. 156, §37.
25 Murray v. Smith, 224 N.Y. 40, 120 N.E. 60 (1918).
26 4 Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §5330.
27 This fact, however, does not mean that the statute takes away or limits the right
of the corporation to bring suit against its officers. The corporation still has a common
law right to hold its officers liable for breach of their fiduciary duty. Manning v. Campbell,
264 Mass. 386, 162 N.E. 770 (1928).
2s ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948 Cum. Supp.) c. 32, §157.42(d); 15 Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.46; 14 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1948 Cum: Supp.) §4997.18; 6 Ohio
Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1938) §8623-123(a); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 116, §42.
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have statutes which seem to limit the right of action to the corporation. However, the Michigan statute, which provides that the officer
or director "... who shall knowingly violate the provisions of this
section shall be liable to the corporation ... ,"29 has only recently been
interpreted as benefi.tting creditors as well as stockholders. 30 Only in
Oklahoma are all doubts eliminated by express language in the statute
making the directors liable to both the corporation and its creditors.31
New York, for a long time, has held that its statute was intended
to protect only creditors, even though any view is possible under the
language of its statute; and the protection is given to those who extended credit prior to repayment of the loan.32 Probably all but the
Indiana and Massachusetts courts will agree with this latter point.
A reading of the statutes in those two states would seem to indicate
that directors can be liable only for debts contracted between the time
of making or assenting to the loan and the time of its repayment. 33
Why creditors of the corporation prior to the making of the loan
should be barred from using this remedy is a question which cannot
be sensibly answered. Such a creditor should receive the same protection as that given by the statute to one who becomes a creditor
after the loan is made.
The New York courts, which have held that the statute is intended for the protection of the creditors only, have denied a trustee
in bankruptcy the right to maintain an action under the statute.34
On the other hand, a federal court has allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to sue the directors under a Mississippi statute which limits
liability thereunder to creditors.35 The problem involved is whether
a trustee may sue third parties on behalf of the creditors, and the
2Dlbid.
80Jn re Wood's Estate, 299 Mich. 635, 1 N.W. (2d) 19 (1941). The court's
decision may be questioned in regard to its reliance on Lester v. The Howard Bank, 33 Md.
558 (1871). In that case, the Maryland statute provided only for the punishment of its
violators. There was no express language in the statute to the effect that violators would be
liable to the corporation, as there is in the Michigan statute.
8118 Okla. Stat. (1947 Cum. Supp.) §1.175(b).
82Billings v. Trask, 30 Hun. 314 (1883); Waters v. Spalt, 80 N.Y.S. (2d) 681
(1948). The fact that a stockholder is a creditor does not prevent him from employing
the remedy given to creditors by the statute. Dustin v. Randall Faichney Corp., 263
Mass. 99, 160 N.E. 528 (1928).
83 25 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1948) §251; 5 Mass. Ann. Laws (1948) c. 156, §37.
84 Stolz v. Ginsburg, 217 A.D. 701, 215 N.Y.S. 927 (1926), affd. 245 N.Y. 519,
157 N.E. 841 (1927).
85 In re Dalton Electric Co., (D. C. Miss. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 465.
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decision of the federal court may be questioned today in the light
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1938.36 However, if the Mississippi
statute can be interpreted as giving a right of action to the corporation
also, the decision seems satisfactory.

Conclusions
In summary, it may be said again that the purpose of the loan
statute is to prevent a dissipation of capital through loans. On this
point, and this point alone, will agreement be found among the courts.
If this is the only rationale which can be offered, the statute seems
unnecessary for two reasons: (I) dissipation of capital is not necessarily concomitant with a loan of corporate funds; and (2) common
law and other statutory remedies provide sufficient protection to the
corporation and its creditors. In view of the first reason, it appears
reprehensible to term the statute penal in nature, as some states do, 37
and subject its violators to criminal prosecution for making loans which
do not dissipate assets. A desirable solution may involve either a repeal of the statute, or a revision or judicial reinterpretation of it which
will provide for the directors, who are made liable for loans which
are not improper as measured by common law standards, a means of
reimbursement from the corporation. Such a solution would provide
some relief to directors without taking away from creditors the advantage of the present loan statutes.
Paul W. Eaton, Jr.

36 52 Stat. L. 842, §2 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §11 (1948 Cum. Supp.); 52 Stat. L. 860,
§47 (1938), 11 u.s.c. §75 (1943).
37 In Illinois, directors who violate the statute are guilty of conspiracy and subject
to criminal prosecution. ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948 Cum. Supp.) c. 32, §157.42(h).
In Minnesota, the violation is a felony punished by fine or imprisonment. 20 Minn. Stat.
Ann. (1945) §300.60. Also, see Billings v. Trask, 30 Hun. 314 (1883). Contra, Cole
v. Brandle, 127 N.J.Eq. 31, 11 A. (2d) 255 (1940), holding that the statute is remedial.

